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Criminal Procedure
By ALBERT T. QUICK*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Supreme Court handed down a number of
decisions in the area of criminal procedure during the past
year.' This article will examine those decisions which had a
significant impact in the areas of search and seizure, harmless
error, and the evidentiary use of similar criminal acts against
the same victim. 2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.A. 1962 University of
Arizona; M.A. 1964 Central Michigan University; J.D. 1967 Wayne State University;
LL.M. 1974 Tulane University.
I The total number of decisions was 58, 40 of which were unpublished opinions.
2 In addition to the decisions discussed in the text, four other decisions deserve
notice. In Riley v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1976), the Court decided an
issue of first impression. The appeal was from an order denying a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The defendant had been indicted, tried and convicted of breaking and
entering. It was his undenied contention that he was kidnapped from the State of
Michigan without any sort of extradition papers by Graves County authorities to stand
trial in Kentucky. The Court relied on Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbee
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), in holding that "a writ of habeas corpus will not lie to
challenge the conviction or imprisonment of one who was brought by unlawful means
into the jurisdiction where he was convicted." 539 S.W.2d at 286.
In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1976) the Court looked at
the impact of an improper waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to the circuit court. In 1974
Hamilton was charged in a two count indictment with storehouse breaking and being
a habitual criminal. His claim on appeal was that the habitual criminal charge based
on a 1971 conviction in Kenton Circuit Court was invalid because there was an impro-
per waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to the circuit court. The Court examined the waiver
and found that it was based on the conclusion that it was in the best interest of
Hamilton and the public. Thus the waiver order did not meet the Kentucky require-
ments that it show that the juvenile had a hearing and was represented by counsel,
and that it list the reasons for the transfer. Since the waiver was invalid, the Court
held that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try Hamilton on the charge, and that
the waiver could not serve as the basis for a habitual criminal charge.
The United States Supreme Court recently decided in Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501 (1976), that upon timely objection an accused may not be compelled to stand
trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothing. In Scrivener v. Com-
monwealth, 539 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1976), the Kentucky Court followed the Williams
decision, holding it was reversable error not to grant a continuance so that the defen-
dant could be tried in street clothing rather than in identifiable prison clothing.
The final case, Stephens v. Bonding Association of Kentucky, 538 S.W.2d 580
(1976), fits best under the heading of Constitutional Law, but it has a significant
impact on the criminal justice system. The appellees were able to pursuade a Jefferson
County Circuit Court that House Bill No. 254, relating to the prohibition or abolition
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I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Automobile Searches
Various legal theories have been developed by courts to
determine the validity of warrantless automobile searches.
3
Recently the Kentucky Supreme Court was called upon to de-
cide the applicability of two of these theories in Patrick v.
Commonwealth.' The facts established that at approximately
2:30 a.m., a patrolman for the City of Danville saw the defen-
dant, Patrick, walk away from the front of a store in a shopping
center, enter a car, and drive away. The patrolman followed the
car for a short distance and then signaled Patrick to stop.5 Also
in the car with the defendant was a passenger, Alvin Ferguson,
Jr. While asking Patrick for his registration, the officer ob-
served a pair of gloves on the floor of the left front side of the
car. Patrick could not furnish proof of registration and was
asked to drive the car to the police station, where all three went
inside. While waiting for the registration verification, the offi-
cer made a "character" check of Patrick and Ferguson which
disclosed that Ferguson had been charged previously with pos-
session of stolen property. The officer then went back to the car
to get the gloves. He opened the left front door and saw a lug
wrench and a tire tool protruding from under the front seat
along with the handle of a hammer, which he spotted with the
of the bail bondsmen business, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
reversed, finding no violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution or Section I of the Kentucky Consitution. The Court justified the prohibition
as being within the police power of the legislature and as not being a taking of property
without due process of law. This decision by the Court would appear to rest on solid
ground in light of the United States Supreme Court holding in New Orleans v. Duke,
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
1 See, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)(consent search); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)(caretaker search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970), rehearing denied 400 U.S. 856 (1970)(probable cause that contents offend
the law); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view seizure); Application
of Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969)(search incident to a valid arrest).
535 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1976).
Apparently no issue was raised concerning the legality of the stop. In Common-
wealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971) the Court held:
The stopping of an automobile on the highway does not involve a search nor
does it involve an arrest. It is nothing more than the initial stopping. We
know of no reason why a peace officer should not be permitted to stop any
vehicle on the highway at any time for any reasonable purpose. Id. at 263.
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aid of a flashlight. The officer then opened the right door and
discovered a chisel lying beside the front seat. These tools were
seized and became the basis for the charge of possession of
burglary tools.
The two theories' presented by the Commonwealth to jus-
tify this warrantless search and seizure were the plain view
doctrine7 and probable cause that the car contained the instru-
ments or fruits of the crime.' The Court held that the Common-
wealth was not entitled to invoke the plain view doctrine and
stated:
[T]he tools here were not in plain view before the car doors
were opened, nor were they inadvertently come across during
the course of opening the car doors for a legitimate custodial
purpose .... There was no valid reason for the officer to take
the gloves from the car, so his opening of the door for the
purpose cannot justify the subsequent observing of the tools.
In holding as it did, the Court was following federal guide-
lines. The issue of the constitutional application of the plain
view doctrine was considered in the case of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,0 in which the United States Supreme Court set
down criteria for determining the validity of a plain view" sei-
zure. 12 A plurality of the Court instructed that the police must
have a prior justification for an intrusion 3 which leads to the
inadvertant discovery" by observation of an article of incrimi-
nating character. 5 The Patrick decision turned on the Com-
I It should be noted that in the decision the Court also determined that the search
could not be justified as one made incidental to an arrest, and that it would be difficult
to sustain as an inventory of the car's contents under the holding in City of Danville
v. Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1975).
7 Seizures under this doctrine are generally considered to be simply seizures with-
out a search, in that the police have a prior justification for the intrusion. See Moylan,
The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography
Battle, 26 MERcER L. REV. 1047 (1975).
This exception can be traced to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Ky. 1976).
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
" The plain view doctrine is generally regarded as originating in Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
"Id. at 469.
' Id. at 466.
" In discussing the plain view doctrine, the Court also mentioned the lack of
1976]
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monwealth's inability to establish a prior justification for the
intrusion of opening of the doors to the automobile."6 The Court
concluded that "[t]here was no valid reason for the officer to
take the gloves from the car, so his opening of the door for that
purpose cannot justify the subsequent observing of the tools."17
In Patrick the Court has taken a much needed first step
in establishing the elements for the application of the plain
view doctrine, since prior to this case the Court had spoken
only generally in regard to the legal application of a plain view
seizure of evidence from automobiles.18 Because this type of
seizure is an exception to the warrant requirement, it is impor-
tant that the application be delineated, so as not to interfere
with the legitimate use of a warrant.'9 However, this case did
not present a situation for the Court to decide the basis for
determining when it is immediately apparent2' to the police
that they have incriminating evidence before them and the
measure of determining inadvertence.2' Unfortunately, these
issues will have to await a future determination by the Court.
The second theory advanced by the Commonwealth to jus-
tify the search and seizure fared no better than the first. The
prosecution hoped to bring the search and seizure within the
framework of the so-called "Carroll Doctrine,"22 which sanc-
tions a search and seizure if the police have probable cause to
believe that "the contents of the automobile offend against the
law."' 23 This probable cause belief" must exist prior to the
probable cause in this case, but it is clear from an entire reading that prior justification
was the missing element.
11 Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ky. 1976).
,1 Hollowell v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1973).
18 Kentucky law appears to recognize this point in the case of Caine v. Common-
wealth, 491 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Ky. 1973).
11 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
0 See State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 350 (1966), wherein a conviction was reversed
because the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe confiscated
pills were contraband.
21 For a general discussion on this point see The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85
HI Rv. L. REv. 3, 244-46 (1971).
22 See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2' Id. at 159.
2, Probable cause was defined in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, (1925) as
"a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction ... " Id. at 149.
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search of the automobile. The Court held in Patrick that the
facts known to the officer did not give rise to probable cause.
The facts present were that Patrick and Ferguson were in the
vicinity of a store at an unusual hour, that Patrick had no
registration receipt for the car, and that Ferguson had on a
prior occasion been charged with possession of stolen prop-
erty. 25
The interesting aspect about this part of the decision is
that the Court was confronted with a similar situation in 1974
and found that probable cause existed for the search. In
Scillion v. Commonwealth,'2 the officer observed a pair of
gloves in plain view in the automobile, and had heard21 that
Scillion had dangerous propensities and had carried a weapon
in his car on a prior occasion. Apparently the only significant
difference was that in Scillion, the facts known to the officer
related to weapons, a factual difference in nature but not in
degree. The Court felt the need to distinguish the two cases but
merely commented that in Scillion "the search was for a
weapon or weapons which the arresting officer had cause to
believe might then and there be used against him. '2 8
In holding as it did, the Court may be taking the first step
toward establishing a justification for a warrantless search
based on a reasonable belief by the officer that weapons could
be used against him. This theory would apparently be an ex-
tension of the "stop and frisk" principle in two respects: first,
it would allow a search as opposed to a frisk, 9 and second, it
would allow the intrusion to extend beyond the person, in this
case to an automobile.A0 Although appealing from the stand-
point of safeguarding the law enforcement officer, this theory
creates yet another exception to the warrant requirement.
However, this exception is not without support. In 1976 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that a seizure
11 Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ky. 1976).
508 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1974).
The facts reported do not indicate how the police officer gained this informa-
tion. This would seem to be essential in determining whether it could be the basis for
probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
2 Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Ky. 1976).
" A "frisk" is defined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
3' See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) for a case involving the frisk of an
individual seated in an automobile.
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of marijuana from a sack in an automobile was justified where
the officer reasonably considered his safety in jeopardy.31 The
officer had stopped the accused for a traffic violation. As he was
preparing to examine the individual's driver's license, he
flashed his light into the car and saw a closed, partially filled
grocery bag on the floor between the driver's legs. Having found
weapons in bags before, the officer feared for his safety which
led to his examination of the bag and the seizure of evidence.2
Thus, careful attention should be paid to the Court's statement
in Patrick to determine if it is a precursor of an extension of
the stop and frisk principle.
B. Third Party Consent33
The legal principle of third party consent as developed by
Kentucky courts can generally be traced1' from a legal concept,
which has lent itself to a relatively broad application .3 This
concept focuses primarily on the identification of an individual
who is "the owner or person in charge of a house at the time a
search is made . . . ," who is then allowed to consent to a
search against anotherY.3 Initially this concept was narrowly
applied to include only those individuals who held an owner-
ship interest in the place to be searched or were accorded the
status of head of the household to be searched. A resident
owner could consent on behalf of co-resident,8 for example,
while a mother who was either owner or in control of household
could consent on behalf of resident son,3 and a wife with equal
3, Johnson v. United States, No. 9330 (D.C. Cir., January 22, 1976).
31 Id. at 2.
33 For an interesting discussion of this issue see Comment, Third-Party Consent
Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 CHI. L. Rxv. 121 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
11 An exception to this statement may be found in the case of Banks v. Common-
wealth, 227 S.W. 455 (Ky. 1921) wherein the facts do not indicate whether the interest
of the party against whom the search is directed was a greater or equal interest.
31 However, as noted in this section, the facts of a particular case strain the
application.
3'8 Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1961).
31 The decision did not appear to turn on any analysis of the relative interest
between the party giving consent and the party against whom the search was directed.
11 Banks v. Commonwealth, 227 S.W. 455, 458 (Ky. 1921).
3, Gray v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W. 769 (Ky. 1923).
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control over the home could consent on behalf of husband. 40
In 1971 the application of this concept was significantly
extended in Garr v. Commonwealth.41 In Garr the sister of the
appellant was recognized as legally able to give consent when
she was neither the owner of the property nor the recognized
head of the household. The Court reasoned that the sister was
temporarily in charge of her parents' premises during their
absence, and, as a full-time temporary resident, her possessory
interest was at least coextensive with the appellant's interest.
Thus the Court recognized that interests less than ownership
or status as head of the household could serve as a basis for
third party consent. However, in order to determine if such
consent was legally sufficient, the Court had to assess the rela-
tive interests of each party. If the interest of the consenting
party was greater than42 or equal to 3 the interest of the ag-
grieved party, the consent would be upheld. In Garr, the Court
found that the appellant's interest was based on the fact that
he occasionally slept on the premises when in the area and had
not established any exclusive possession or control over any
portion of the house. This interest was not determined to be
superior or equal to that of the consenting party, a point the
Court viewed as essential to its decision."4
Recently, the Court was again faced with a question of
third party consent in Butler v. Commonwealth." In that case,
the search, took place at the apartment of a woman who had
lived with the appellant" for several years and who was the
mother of his child. Some weeks prior to the search, however,
she had put appellant out of the apartment and placed him
under a peace bond. On the night before the search, she permit-
ted him to return to the apartment, and he had spent the night.
The next night, her babysitter 47 admitted the police into the
40 Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1973).
463 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1971).
4' Id. at 113.
13 Id. citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
44 Id.
536 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1976).
" Id. The Court recognized that the appellant had standing to challenge the
legality of the search, based on the holding in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960).
'7 Since the record on appeal did not expressly reflect who employed the babysit-
ter, the Court assumed that the mother had done so.
1976]
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apartment while she was away. The officers told the babysitter
they were looking for the appellant and asked if they could look
inside, to which she replied, "Sure."4 Once inside, they found
and arrested the appellant and seized incriminating evidence.
The Court upheld the search49 and seizure based on the consent
given by the babysitter. In deciding this case, the Court again
found that an assessment of the parties' possessory interest was
crucial.The Court stated: "In this instance we think the status
of Butler relative to that of the babysitter was even more ten-
uous, and that, as between the two, the babysitter had the
superior right of dominion and control, and the right to permit
the search."50
In basing this decision on who had the superior right of
dominion and control, the Court was faced with a close set of
facts, in contrast to the situation in Garr, where factors were
present upon which the judgment could more easily be made.
Here the Court's use of the label "casual" 51 to denote the appel-
lant's interest seems to discount his having lived with the
woman for several years and the uncertainty of whether his
return to her apartment was casual or permanent. The babysit-
ter was apparently judged to have the superior interest solely
because of her position.52 There was no evidence that she was
given any special control from which consent could be im-
puted53 or that she was granted any actual authority to con-
sent. 4
This case reflects the weakness in relying exclusively on
one set of criteria in determining the superior interest. Since
the recognition of a valid consent can turn aside the protection
of the fourth amendment, the Court may in the future want to
4' Butler v. Commonwealth, 536 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ky. 1976).
"The Court for sake of argument found that the arrest was unlawful, and no
attempt was made to justify the seizure on the theory that it was incident to a lawful
arrest.
Butler v. Commonwealth, 536 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Ky. 1976).
, Id. at 140.
52 Id.
11 Such additional evidence of control might be found, for example, if the babysit-
ter was given some special right of access like a key to the apartment. See People v.
Misquez, 313 P.2d 206 (Cal. App. 1957) which was cited by the Court.
5, If actual authority had been granted, it might have been subject to scrutiny
under the estrangement doctrine. See United States ex reL. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz,
431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970).
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assess relative interests based on the concept of privacy. It is
certainly well established that an individual's right to privacy
is protected by the. fourth amendment if reliance on the right
is justified.15 This right should not be subject to waiver by a
third person who has less justification to assert a claim of pri-
vacy." The application of this principal to the Butler case may
cast a different light on the Court's decision. 57
Other issues seem to call for decision by the Court in
Butler that were not considered, including the voluntariness of
the consent and the scope of its application. The Court has a
long tradition of scrutinizing consent to ascertain if it is volun-
tary, 5 but in this case, no such inquiry was made. Also, the
scope of the consent, as it relates to the area searched, did not
generate any discussion in Butler, although in previous cases
the Court has recognized that consent can be limited, as op-
posed to general. 9 Finally, the Court could have asked if the
area or items searched were in Butler's exclusive use." The
doctrine of exclusive use has support in Kentucky law, and its
effect is to limit the extent of a general consent to search.6'
II. HARMLESS ERROR
A. Restrictions on the Assistance of Counsel2
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
harmless error in Taylor v. Commonwealth,63 concerning effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The opinion focused on whether it
was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse a continuance,
based on defendant's motion for additional time to prepare a
5' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
" Such would be the nature of the relative interests instead of property interests.
', For a case using this approach see People v. Miller, 310 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. App.
1974); see also Comment, supra note 33.
See Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1959).
, See Adams v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. 1950).
,0 Butler v. Commonwealth, 536 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1976). The items seized were
discovered under a pile of clothing and in a coat. The ownership of these items was
never established in the record. If they were owned by the defendant, however, it would
seem that he had the superior interest in possession.
" See Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1973).
" This term is used so as not to imply that counsel because of his own action or
inaction was ineffective.
" Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 75-340 (Ky. April 16, 1976) (per curiam).
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defense. The defendant was indicted on July 25, 1974, and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29, 1974. He was not
formally arrested, however, until he was returned from federal
prison on December 2, 1974. He was then assigned counsel and
arraigned on December 3, 1974 with trial set for December 5,
1974. On the date set for trial, defense counsel's oral motion for
continuance so that he could prepare a defense and subpoena
possible witnesses was denied. On appeal the Court conceded
error, but nevertheless held that it was harmless. 4
This case brings into focus the Court's analysis of the na-
ture of the error and the appropriate test to determine whether
the error is harmless. The Court had the choice of classifying
the error as a violation of state procedural law, or as a violation
of the federal constitution. It chose to classify it as a violation
of state procedure without inquiring whether a federal right
was involved, and based on Kentucky Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 9.04, it held:
[Tihe granting of a continuance is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court and a conviction will not be reversed
for failure to grant a continuance unless that discretion has
been plainly abused and manifest injustice has resulted."5
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court placed the burden on
the appellant to demonstrate that he had additional evidence
which might have been presented if a continuance had been
granted. The majority felt that the appellant had failed to meet
this burden.6
However, it is not clear that this was simply a case involv-
ing a violation of a state procedural rule, and in light of certain
recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the Court
should arguably have explored the question of whether the vio-
lation placed restrictions on counsel which are prohibited by
the sixth and fourteenth amendments.67 The implicit right
found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
guarantees the defendant "the guiding hand of counsel at every
Id.
' Id. at 3.
" Id.
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Brook v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605
(1972).
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stage in the proceedings against him.""8 This right not only
requires the presence of counsel, but also requires that certain
undue restrictions not be placed on him. In the 1972 decision
of Brooks v. Tennessee,9 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated
a statute that required the defendant desiring to testify to do
so before any other testimony was offered by the defense. 0 One
of the basic reasons behind this decision was that, "the statute
restricts the defense-particularly counsel in the planning of
its case."7' Implicit in this opinion is the idea that counsel
should not be restricted in his ability to gain knowledge before
reaching a critical area of a criminal defense. In Brooks, it was
not the right to testify per se that was involved, but that a
decision to testify had to be made without an opportunity to
know the value of defendant's evidence.
In 1975, the Supreme Court struck down a state restriction
denying defense counsel a closing argument in Herring v. New
York.7 2 The Court spelled out what was meant by the constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel:
[T]he right to assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of
counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with
the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has
been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments .... The right to the assistance of counsel has thus
been given a meaning that ensures to the defense in a crimi-
nal trial the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the
adversary factfinding process.73
Although these cases do not specifically deal with a restric-
tion imposed by the denial of a continuance, the basic thrust
of the opinions are aimed at protecting counsel in preparing a
defense for the accused. It is arguable that the facts and cir-
cumstances in the Taylor case fit within the holdings of these
Supreme Court cases. As the dissenting Justice in Taylor
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
" 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
' TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955).
, Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972)(emphasis added).
72 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
" Id. at 857-58.
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pointed out, counsel had one day to investigate a crime occur-
ring several months earlier, consult fully with the accused, seek
discovery, interview prospective witnesses, examine and study
medical and laboratory reports obtained by the prosecutor, re-
search the applicable law, and prepare jury instructions .7 All
of this information would appear to be necessary before counsel
could effectively carry on the adversary fact finding process75
and plan a defense strategy. If this is a reasonable reflecton
of the circumstances facing the defense counsel in Taylor, it
would appear that the Kentucky Supreme Court should have
addressed the issue of constitutonal error before making its
final decision.
The doctrine of harmless error would have been available
to the Court even if it found a constitutional violation of due
process.7 7 The significance of finding constitutional error as
opposed to an error in the application of state procedure, how-
ever, lies in the test used to determine whether the error is
harmless. In Chapman v. California,78 the Supreme Court de-
fined the tests as "requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional
error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. ' ' 7 The
key element of this test is that burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is placed upon the State. This is in stark contrast
to the test applied by the majority in the Taylor case."0 In
addition, if the violation went to the constitutional right of
assistance of counsel, there is strong support for the proposition
that the harmless error doctrine should not apply to such a
fundamental right. In Chapman, after citing the sixth amend-
ment right of assistance of counsel the Court said, "our prior
cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights
7, Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 75-340 at 1-2 of dissent (Ky. April 26, 1976) (per
curiam).
75 This, in general, was the reason for counsel advanced in Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853 (1975).
11 This, in general, was the reason for counsel advanced in Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1972).
11 Id. at 613.
71 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
7' Id. at 24.
s' In Taylor the Court placed the burden on the defendant to show prejudice.
[Vol. 65
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so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error." 81
B. Fifth Amendment Right of Silence
In Niemeyer v. Commonwealth82 the Kentucky Supreme
Court found the improper use by the prosecution of the defen-
dants' failure to deny guilt at the time of arrest and identifica-
tion to be a violation of the fifth amendment, but nonetheless
held the error to be harmless. The defendants, Niemeyer and
Tolbert, were arrested for rape and given their Miranda rights.
They acknowledged their presence at the scene of the crime but
denied any participation in the rape because they were "too
drunk or something."83 At trial the prosecutor questioned both
the prosecutrix and the arresting officer on direct examination
about the defendants' failure to deny their guilt, similarly
questioned both defendants on cross examination, and made
reference to this in his closing argument. 84 Both defendants
were convicted of rape. On appeal, the Court held that the
prosecutor's improper use of the defendants' silence protected
under Miranda was an error of constitutional dimension. The
Court stated:
The efforts of the prosecution to impeach each appellant by
reference to his silence at the time of identification and at the
time of arrest plainly violates his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent.85
The Kentucky decision pre-dated the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio,8" wherein the Court
reached substantially the same conclusion, but based the in-
firmity on the fourteenth amendment rather than the fifth. 87
Both Courts relied heavily on the case of Miranda v. Arizona,8
but differing views as to the meaning of that decision led each
court to a different opinion of which provision in the Constitu-
81 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
AZ 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1976).
' Id. at 219.
A, Id. at 221.
Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Ky. 1976) (emphasis added).
" 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
AZ Id. at 619.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion had been violated. In Doyle, the Court relied on the due
process clause, recognizing that the Miranda decision did not
specifically hold that a violation of the fifth amendment would
occur if a defendant's silence were used for impeachment," or
if evidence obtained in violation of Miranda were used to show
perjury." Thus, the Court turned to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to hold that silence could not be
used for impeachment after the Miranda warnings had been
given. The Court reasoned that although the use of silence may
have some relevancy, it was implicit in the warnings that si-
lence will carry no penalty, and it is therefore, fundamentally
unfair to allow silence to be used in light of this implicit assur-
ance.9 '
On the other hand, the Kentucky Court found that
Miranda did not require a defendant to make any statement
concerning his guilt or innocence.12 The Court reasoned that to
allow impeachment by the use of one's silence after receiving
the Miranda warning was a plain violation of the fifth amend-
ment.13 This approach is not theoretically strong since the pro-
hibition of the prosecution's use of a defendant's silence is
merely supported by dicta in Miranda. In any event, its signifi-
cance appears slight in light of the Doyle decision's applicabil-
ity to the states.
The holding of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Niemeyer
that the error was nonetheless harmless presents a significant
question concerning the applicationof the harmless error doc-
trine: should the doctrine be applied only to those errors which
are without prejudice and accidental as opposed to intentional?
If the Court wishes to deter intentional error, especially of a
constitutional magnitude, then it may be beneficial not to
apply the doctrine where the prosecutor has demonstrated
inexcusable abuse. One cannot help but question why the State
should be the beneficiary of an intentional disregard of a con-
stitutional right by holding the error harmless.9 In Niemeyer
" Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
" See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1972); and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975).
" Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
32 Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Ky. 1976).
93 Id.
'1 This reasoning has been used as part of the justification for the application of
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the Court apparently felt that the prosecutor's actions
amounted to an inexcusable abuse, and it would appear that
one could deter that behavior more effectively by reversal than
by a simple admonishment.
III. THE EVIDENTIARY USE OF SMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS95
The Supreme Court of Kentucky took a bold step in
changing the law in regard to the evidentiary use of similar
criminal acts against the same victim in Ware v.
Commonwealth." In Ware, the defendant was indicted, tried,
and convicted of forceable rape. 7 At the trial, evidence was
introduced showing that the defendant had committed several
rapes upon the same victim during the course of one night. The
trial court required the Commonwealth to elect which act was
to be the basis of the prosecution, holding that in default of
election it would be the act about which substantive proof was
first introduced." The defense then requested that the jury be
admonished to the effect that evidence of other acts of inter-
course by appellant following the first of such incidents could
be considered only for the limited purpose of corroboration.
The trial court failed to admonish the jury on this point. On
appeal the Court chose not to decide the narrow issue of
whether the error was prejudicial, but instead took this oppor-
tunity to point the law in a new direction regarding the eviden-
tiary use of similar criminal acts. The Court stated:
If the state seeks but one conviction out of a series of similar
criminal acts against the same victim, all of the evidence of
all of the acts might as well be treated as and called substan-
tive evidence.9
This holding will profoundly affect the law in Kentucky that
previously required the prosecutor to make an election among
the exclusionary rule to fourth amendment violations. See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
," See 1 WHARTrONS CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 240-264 (13th ed. 1972) for a discussion
of this issue.
537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976).
" Id. at 175-176.
Id. at 178.
, Id. at 179.
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similar acts to determine which one was to be the basis of the
prosecution. It also directly affects the evidentiary rule that a
series of similar acts against the same victim, although admis-
sible, are to be viewed by the fact finder as only corroborative
evidence."10
Once the Court held that all similar acts against the same
victim could be used as substantive evidence, thus eliminating
the need to elect, they had to address the purpose of previously
requiring an election in order to justify a change in the law. The
Court found that there were two reasons for requiring the prose-
cutor to make an election: to enable the defendant to defend
himself by specifying the act; and to protect the defendant
from double jeopardy. ' Justice Palmore spoke directly to the
issue of double jeopardy and disposed of it as an impediment
to the Court's holding by limiting the prosecution in this way:
We think it would have been perfectly proper and fair for the
jury to find him guilty of a single rape.., on the basis of any
one or more of the several separate acts proved. As a conse-
quence, however, he could not thereafter be tried and con-
victed for a second offense of rape based on the same series
of events proved in the first case."0 '
Thus, although the Commonwealth may take advantage of the
evidentiary rule, it may only seek one conviction.
The concept of notice as a reason for election was not dis-
cussed in the same forthright manner. The Court seemed to
infer that since the acts had to have taken place at some time
during the date alleged in the indictment" 3 and to have been
without substantial interruption, the defendant should not be
surprised by evidence of similar criminal acts.
Dispensing with notice as to the specific criminal act that
will form the basis of the prosecution raises several questions.
The first focuses on the ability of the accused to prepare a
defense against a vindictive victim who manufacturers testi-
1® See Bowen v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1941).
M' Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Ky. 1976).
102 Id.
"I Official form no. 15 contained in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sets forth
the language of an indictment: "On or about the - day of _, 19____." Thus, the
indictment itself does not have to state a date, only that the offense occurred on or
about a certain date.
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mony concerning criminal acts.104 For example, suppose person
X has been indicted for forcible rape occurring on a certain
date. The defendant admits to his counsel that he was with the
victim on the evening in question, and that a single act of
intercourse took place which defendant claims was consensual.
Defendant also indicates that a witness can be produced who
will testify to the consensual nature of the act. At the trial,
however, the victim testified not only about the act that defen-
dant claims was consensual, but also about subsequent acts of
rape that allegedly occurred later that same evening without
any witnesses." 5
The second concerns the right to notice concerning the acts
upon which the prosecution will be based ' sufficient to allow
counsel to prepare an effective defense. 0 It appears that a
situation might arise wherein the lack of notice concerning the
act upon which prosecution is to be predicated could encroach
upon the right of the defendant."'
A third question concerns the burden on a defense attorney
in preparing to defend against a series of criminal acts in one
trial and the impact the evidence will have upon the jury. One
way to relieve the burden and reduce the impact is to have
separate trials for each act. While there are both advantages
and disadvantages to separate trials for a series of similar crim-
inal acts,"' the Ware decision provides for the automatic
"I See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365, 1373 (1972) for a general discussion on false accusation.
IM This deficiency in notice would not always be cured by a bill of particulars, in
that defense counsel would not necessarily feel any need to request a more specific
statement.
10 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) holding:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently
in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to
prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with
particularity." Id. at 33.
" See supra note 72.
,u Incidental to the issue of notice is the potential problem of whether a defendant
could be convicted for a criminal act of which he was neither indicted nor informed.
The decision in Ware does not seem to mandate that all criminal acts which may be
introduced at trial must be passed upon by the grand jury or be made a part of an
information. It would appear that one criminal act may be a sufficient basis for an
indictment or information although several acts will be introduced into evidence.
However, such a practice may be a violation of the court's own rules.
I" See 3 TRIL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIUNAL CASES § 263 (Amsterdam
reporter 1975) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL MANUAL].
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"joinder of offenses" without opportunity to challenge that
joinder."10 It is a recognized fact that the courts are not inclined
to grant separate trials when the offenses are either of the same
or similar character or are based on connected transactions,,"1
but this is not to say that the defendant should be foreclosed
from demonstrating to the court that the joinder is prejudicial.
For example, in a case involving forcible rape in which two acts
are alleged, the defendant may have a defense to both acts
which would be believable separately, but unbelievable to-
gether, such as alibi to the first and consent to the second.,,
Other factors may compel separate trials. Joinder may place a
heavy burden upon defense counsel, particularly when the var-
ious acts occur under entirely different circumstances requiring
investigation and preparation of each."' In addition, the more
acts a defendant is charged with, the more suspect he becomes
in the eyes of the jury."' Another factor is that prejudice could
arise from the probable impact the evidence of several criminal
acts has on a jury in recommending the appropriate punish-
ment.
The decision to allow the evidence to be introduced for
substantive purposes instead of corroboration turned on two
factors. First, the Court found that the admonition to the jury
was of little value and that the jury would treat all the criminal
acts as substantive evidence anyway. The Court stated that
this was beneficial in:
[Thus eliminating the fatuous song and dance in which the
jury is permitted to hear about all of the different criminal
acts but is admonished (uselessly, we suggest) not to consider
them as "substantive" evidence against the defendant, but
only insofar as they may tend to show motive or design, or a
lustful disposition on his part, or the relationship of the par-
ties, or to corroborate the witness's testimony with respect to
the offense for which the defendant is being tried."'5
,,0 See Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976).
' See Rigsby v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Ky. 1973).
lZ TRIAL MANUAL at 1-272.
", The American Bar Association's standards relating to the defense function
require that the defense attorney investigate all the facts relevant to guilt. Query if
this standard could be met if the attorney was faced with multiple criminal acts.
.. TRIAL MANUAL at 1-272.
"I Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 178-79 (Ky. 1976).
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The reason for the admonition is, of course, to defuse the possi-
bility of prejudice that the defendant may suffer by the intro-
duction of a series of criminal acts. An admonition may or may
not in any given case have a great deal of impact on the jury,
but surely it provides some measure of protection that should
not have been removed without a greater showing that it is
ineffective."'
Second, the Court indicated that since the criminal acts
were in effect a single or inseparable transaction, they fell
within the res gestae exception, defined by Wigmore as "other
criminal acts which are an inseparable part of the whole
deed,""' which may be introduced without an admonition. The
question therefore becomes what is meant by acts that are an
inseparable part of the whole deed? Wigmore, who was cited
by the Court in Ware, gave this example:
Suppose that A is charged with stealing the tools of X; the
evidence shows that a box of carpenter's tools was taken, and
that in it were the tools of Y and Z as well as of X; here we
are incidentally proving the commission of two additional
crimes, because they are necessarily interwoven with the
stealing charged, and together form one deed.118
It is clear that this class of criminal acts is an inseparable
element of the crime charged. But, do the criminal acts in Ware
reasonably fall within this class? The evidence showed that
Ware committed several acts of rape against the victim during
the same evening, two other individuals raped her, and then,
Ware and the victim went with others to the city of Somerset.
The res gestae rule was apparently unduly stretched to find
that Ware's criminal acts were inseparable from one another.
This decision, therefore, is certain to cause controversy not only
on a theoretical level, but also at the practical level in defining
terms such as transactions and similar offenses.
"I The only evidence to support this reasoning appeared to be the Justice's own
beliefs. Id.
"' I WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 218 at 719 (3d ed. 1940).
"' Id.
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